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SMYTH v. AMES IN STATE COURTS, 1942 TO 1952
WALLACE MENDELSON*
Smyth v. Ames 1 imposed upon the regulatory process the doctrine
that a public utility has a judicially enforceable, constitutional right
to a "reasonable return" upon the "fair value" of its operating
property. Based upon eminent domain theory,2 the "fair value" rule
implied at least the pretense (and in practice was apt to mean) that
to be constitutionally valid rate regulation must keep investors in
at least as favorable a financial position as they would enjoy if they
were unregulated and yet retained their monopolistic status. This
judicial casuistry resulted in high charges and widespread con-
sumer resentment-important factors in the broad movement to-
ward public ownership that followed.
In enunciating this position the court listed seven factors "for
consideration" and recognized that there might be "other matters to
be regarded" in estimating "fair value." There was no indication
of what these "other matters" might be, their relationship to the
listed factors, nor of the relative weight to be attached to any of the
items mentioned. Subsequent decisions, however, severely limited
administrative discretion by giving "reproduction cost" (an item
not listed in the Smyth case) a controlling position.4 Because in
general our economy has been characterized by a rising level of
prices, reproduction cost favored utilities. Regulatory bodies and
consumers have tended accordingly to emphasize actual, historical
cost--the "prudent investment" principle being merely a refine-
ment of the latter. The recent Hope case6 illustrates the vast rate
differences implicit in the choice of approach. There the company's
*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee.
1. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
2. Id. at 522-26.
3. Id. at 546-7.
4. This development culminated in McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co.,
272 U. S. 400 (1926).
5. Bauer, Transforming Public Utility Regulation 35-36 (1950).
6. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
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depreciated reproduction cost figure was $66,000,000.7 The Federal
Power Commission's depreciated "actual legitimate cost" figure
was $33,712,526.8 On the basis of a 62 per cent return the implicit
rate differential is over 2 million dollars per year.
Thanks to the "Roosevelt Court" the "fair value merry-go-
round" has now been abandoned by the federal judiciary. The
Pipeline case' held that "the Constitution does not bind rate-making
bodies to the service of any single formula or combination of
formulas," and that if a rate order, "as applied to the facts . . .
and viewed in its entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our in-
quiry is at an end."'" While these and other remarks in the opinion
clearly suggest a new attitude, they are not necessarily at odds with
the Smyth decision! For all that appears in the Pipeline case the
rates there in question may have been sustained merely because they
were not in fact'"confiscatory" under "fair value" doctrine. In that
view Pipeline might mean simply that regulating agencies were to
have greater freedom in using valuation formulas, but they would
still be required to find a "fair value" rate base via one or more
of the elements mentioned in the "hodge-podge" of Sinyth v.
Ames.
In 1944 this problem was settled by the Hope case:
... rate-making is indeed but one species of price-fixing.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 134. The fixing of prices, like
other applications of the police power, may reduce the value of
property which is being regulated. But the fact that value is
reduced does not mean that the regulation is invalid. Block
v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 155-157; Nebbia v. New York, 291
U. S. 502, 523-539, and cases cited. It does, however, indicate
that "fair value" is the end product of the process of rate-
making not the starting point as the Circuit Court of Appeals
held. The heart of the matter is that rates cannot be made to
depend upon "fair value" when the value of the going enter-
prise depends upon earnings under whatever rates may be
anticipated.:"
This substitution of the police power for eminent domain as the
constitutional foundation for rate regulation means that "it is the
7. Id. at 597.
8. Id. at 600.
9. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U. S. 575 (1942).
10. Id. at 586. In this (and the Hope case), the Court was dealing with
statutory rate-making standards. But it noted (at page 586) that "the Con-
gressional standard prescribed by this statute coincides with that of the
Constitution, and that courts are without authority under the statute to set
aside as too low any 'reasonable rate' adopted by the Comission which is
consistent with constitutional requirements."
11. 320 U. S. at 601 (1944).
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result reached not the method employed that is controlling.
Moreover, the Commission's order does not become suspect by
reason of the fact that it is challenged. It is the product of expert
judgment which carries a presumption of validity. And he who
would upset the rate order . . . carries the heavy burden of mak-
ing a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust
and unreasonable in its consequences . .. Rates [as here] which
enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its finan-
cial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for
the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even
though they might produce only a meager return on the so-called
'fair value' rate base." 12
That was the end of the Smyth "fair value" doctrine in the
federal courts. Administrative regulation of rates was resurrected
as a possible alternative to public ownership of "natural monopo-
lies." But the Sinyth case still haunts the states. If this were true
only with respect to state court interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment-as seems to be the case in Washington, Vermont,
and Minnesota-the matter would be subject to correction by the
federal judiciary. But 8 out of the other 12 state supreme courts
that have dealt with the problem have found that all or part of
Smyth v. Ames is imbedded (and permissibly so) in state law.'3
Thus it is beyond the reach of the Pipeline and Hope decisions.
For they indicate merely that the Smyth approach is not a consti-
tutionally required ingredient in rate-making. It is still a permissible
ingredient.1 4 The same self-denying ordinance that blocks extensive
court "protection" of investors from the terrors of rate regulation,
similarly prevents judicial intrusion on behalf of consumers. There
is no evidence that the old double standard which served the utili-
ties so well is to be reversed in favor of their customers.
States requiring full adherence to fair value doctrine
In Pennsylvania, Ohio, North Dakota, South Dakota, Minne-
sota, and Massachusetts' 5 the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames is in full
bloom-together with the related Ben Avon 6 rule that where con-
12. id. at 602, 605.
13. See below.
14. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 581, 601-4 (1945).
15. In Norfolk v. Chesapeak & Patomac Tel. Co., 192 Va. 292, 64 S. E.
2d 772 (1951), and PSC v. Indianapolis Ry. Co., 225 Ind. 30, 72 N. E. 2d
434 (1947) the Virginia and Indiana Supreme Courts respectively recognized
that Hope presented a challenge, but cautiously avoided meeting it.




fiscation is alleged the utility is entitled to have that issue deter-
mined "independently" by the courts.
In 1943 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the
"legislative mandate in this commonwealth is that the rate base
is fair value. .. except that for the determination of temporary
rates ... original cost less accrued depreciation may be used ...
As late as 1939, this court pointed out, the cost of reproducing the
property has consistently been held not only a relevant, but also an
essential element in the ascertainment of its 'fair value' for rate-
making purposes."' 71 A few months after the Hope decision the
same court observed that prudent investment is excluded "under
the law of this state. . . . Reproduction cost is still an important
and essential element" of fair value in Pennsylvania.'8 Subsequent
decisions through 1951 are to the same effect."'
Some three years after Hope the Supreme Court of Ohio ob-
served that "on several occasions this court has held that the
General Assembly in delegating rate-making power to the Public
Utility Commission has limited the Commission in the valuation
of physical property, other than land, for rate-making purposes, to
reproduction cost as of a date certain less observed depreciation.
. . .- 2o In support of this the court quoted from an earlier Ohio
case which had rejected prudent investment "because the Legis-
lature has adopted the principle of the rule set out in Smyth v.
Ames .... ,21 It was then observed that for a number of years after
the adoption of this legislation cities were satisfied and utilities
were inclined to complain. Now due to higher prices cities are
disposed to complain. "If the original interpretation was sound, it
still.remains so, even though economic conditions have changed in
the meantime. If the statute has become outmoded, the remedy must
be attained through the legislative branch of the government and
not in the courts. 22
The highest court of North Dakota observed in 1944 that "In
17. Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Penn. Public Utilities Com., 153 Pa.
Super. 475, 34 A. 2d 375, 379-380 (1943).
18. Philadelphia Transport Co. v. Penn. Public Utilities Com., 155 Pa.
Super. 9, 37 A. 2d 138, 145 (1944).
19. Equitable Gas Co. v. Penn. Public Utilities Com., 160 Pa. Super.
458, 51 A. 2d 497 (1947) ; Pittsburg v. Penn. Public Utilities Com., 165 Pa.
Super. 519, 69 A. 2d. 844 (1949) ; Pittsburg v. Penn. Public Utilities Com.,
168 Pa. Super. 95, 78 A. 2d. 35 (1951).
20. Marietta v. Public Utilities Corn., 148 Ohio St. 173, 74 N. E. 2d.
74, 78 (1947).
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at 183, 74 N. E. 2d at 79.
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the former appeal in this case . . . we held that the fair value
formula as set out in Smyth v. Ames . . had been adopted by the
Legislature of this State in 1919 .... There can be no doubt today,
but that, insofar as the federal courts are concerned, the 'ghost of
Smyzth v. Ames had been laid. . . .' That circumstance, however,
has no bearing upon the question now before us. We are concerned
with the law of this state as enacted in 1919."23
As indicated above the Minnesota Supreme Court still adheres
to Smlih doctrine. It along with Vermont's and Vashington's are
apparently the only courts which predicate that position upon the
supposed requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. In In re
Applicatioa of Mlinneapolis Street Railway,2 4 decided some five
years after Hope, the city contended inter alia that an "emergency
or temporary rate increase must not be more than sufficient to
meet fixed charges and operating expenses. '2 After casually
mentioning that Minnesota legislation required rates to be based
on "fair value, '2 6 the court rejected the city's contention on pure-
ly constitutional grounds:
In fixing an emergency or temporary street railway rate of
fare, the commission has the power to fix it in such an amount
as will produce revenue not only necessary to meet fixed
charges and operating expenses, but also sufficient to yield a
reasonable return on the fair value of the property devoted to
street railway use. As a matter of law, a rate of fare in such an
amount is required because a lesser one would be confiscatory.
and violative of due process .... This rule is a well-established
one, applicable generally to fixing rates of public utilities.27
The three cases cited in support of these propositions make it
clear that the "due process" referred to is that of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There is not the slightest indication that the Minne-
sota Supreme Court had ever heard of either Pipeline or Hope.
In a South Dakota case28 the utility commission and the trial
court ("reviewing" the matter independently), both started their
"fair value" inquiry with the utility's book cost. They differed as
to the adjustments which should be made thereto. The state
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's position in an opinion
which by liberal quotations from Chief justice Hughes in the
23. Northern States Power Co. v. Public Service Com., 73 N. D. 211, 13
N. W. 2d. 779, 785-6 (1944).
24. 228 Minn. 435, 37 N.W. 2d. 533 (1949).
25. Id. at 440, 37 N. W. 2d. at 537.
26. Id. at 438, 37 N. W. 2d. at 534.
27. Id. at 442,37 N.W. 2d. at 537.
28. I re Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 43 N. W. 2d. 553 (1950).
1953]
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St. Joseph Stock Yards case2" manages to read both "fair value"
and Ben Avon doctrine into the state constitution's due process
clause. There is no mention whatsoever of Pipeline or Hope and
consequently no need for reconsidering Ben Avon in the light
which they cast.
In a far more sophisticated manner the M1assachusetts Supreme
Court arrived at the same result fully conscious of the problems
involved:
the Declaration of Rights guarantees to an owner, who alleges
that confiscation of his property will result from a rate order of
the department, a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to
a court for determination upon its own independent judgment
as to both law and facts .... the rates must yield a fair return
upon the fair value of the property ...
It is unnecessary for us to undertake to estimate the effect
upon the doctrine of the Ben Avon case of certain relatively
recent cases in the Supreme Court of the United States. [citing
Pipeline and Hope inter alia] ... We do not rest our decision
upon a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment .... 3
The case is the more interesting because while the regulatory
agency claimed that it had followed its long established "prudent
investment" practice, the Supreme Court observed that the agency's
order "is virtually barren of findings which reveal the principles
underlying [its] conclusions." 31 Moreover the court thought it not
clear that the agency had in fact followed, or could properly rely
upon, the "prudent investment" approach. 32 The regulatory agency
has professed to adhere to its [prudent investment] rule not-
withstanding the statement of the Supreme Court of the United
States and of this court that the rates must be sufficient to yield
a fair return on the value of the property .... It is unnecessary
to expiate upon this aspect of the case, as in any event the
order, as will be seen, is confiscatory.3 3
Then comes the ironical ending. As though taking double care to
make its decision appeal-proof, but perhaps only to avoid unneces-
sary commitment, the Massachusetts Supreme Court phrased its
conclusion in language consonant with the Hope position:
. . . irrespective of whether the earnings permitted by the
order were, or should have been, proportioned to any rate base,
29. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38 (1936).
30. Lowell Gas Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 324 Mass. 80, 89, 84
N. E. 2d. 811, 816-817 (1949).
31.Id. at 94,84 N. E. 2d at 819.
31. Id. at 94, 84 N. E. 2d. at 819.
32. Id. at 95, 84 N. E. 2d. at 820.
33. Ibid.
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whatever may have been the theory upon which such rate base
was, or should have been determined, the order . . . is con-
fiscatory."
It would not be accurate to say that Georgia still adheres to
Smyth doctrine. That has not yet been decided. But in a 1949 de-
cision"' the Georgia Supreme Court was so unaffected by develop-
ments in the federal judiciary that it was still able to base a' Ben
Avon conclusion upon the Fourteenth Amendment. Not even
mentioning Hope, it presumably saw no threat to Ben Avon from
that quarter, or any other.3 6
The Supreme Court of the United States in many cases has
held that, where a public service commission or board pre-
scribes rates under which the utility company affected claims
that its property will be confiscated, the State must provide a
fair opportunity for submitting the issue to a judicial tribunal
for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both
law and facts, otherwise the order would be void because in con-
flict with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.8
Similarly the Wisconsin Supreme Court has given some hints
but has not clearly committed itself either for or against "fair
value." In the famous Two Rivers case38 the state Public Service
Commission, relying upon Hope, announced that
there will be a determination and finding of neither a rate-base
nor of a rate of return for the purposes of this proceeding ....
The rates herein prescribed are estimated and intended to af-
ford approximately an annual net profit of a determined num-
ber of dollars which we think it reasonable for the utility to
enjoy from the operation of its business.3 9
Three factors which the commission said it considered essential
considerations in reaching its conclusion were (1) estimated future
operating expenses "(2) The value of any class of [the] utility's
service, where that value constitutes the limitation upon and prac-
tical equivalent of the rates charged therefore. (3) A reasonable
profit which is proper for the utility to enjoy under all relevant
facts and circumstances.114o
34. Id. at 102, 84 N. E. 2d. at 824.
35. Georgia Public Service Com., v. Atlanta Gas St. Co., 205 Ga. 863,
55 S. E. 2d 618 (1949).
36. See, for example, Rd. Com. of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co.,
310 U. S.573 (1940), 311 U. S. 614 (1941), 311 U. S. 570 (1941).
37. 55 S. E. 2d 618, at 627 (1949).38. Commonwealth Tel. Co. v. Public Service Com., 252 Wis. 481, 32
N. W. 2d 247 (1948).




In an opinion in which Chief justice Rosenberry joined, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the "present method of the
Commission is improper and must be abandoned. 14 1 Quoting at
length from Hope's case, it was observed that
From that recital of facts it appears that the Federal Power
Commission had at least some basis upon which it was figur-
ing the fair return for the Hope Gas Company. The Public
Service Commission in this case appears to have carried the
theory which it spelled out of the Hope Case several steps
further, and determined to keep the entire basis a secret....
How can the commission or the reviewing court or the
utility or the public determine whether the profit is proper
unless the commission makes specific findings of the "relevant
facts and circumstances"? The commission must determine
what those are and set them forth as required by law. Those
essential facts which control each case will then determine the
rate base [emphasis added] .42
The reference to a "rate base" sounds ominous, but it is so out of
place in the context of the entire opinion that it may have been
merely a matter of rhetorical inadvertency. The explicitness which
the court required of the commission is not necessarily at odds
with the new federal approach. But doubtless some will feel that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court is not friendly to the idea that it
should merely look at the administrative end result and sustain it
unless the utility "carries the heavy burden of making a convincing
showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in
its consequences."
States "accepting" Pipeline but not Hope
Alabama, Idaho, and New Jersey legislation is held to require
the finding of a rate base. At least in the cases of Idaho and New
Jersey this interpretation of the legislative will is questionable. 3
But in all three states there is a linguist acceptance of the Pipeline
idea that no "single formula or combination of formulas" is con-
trolling.
In the original hearing of its only relevant case the Alabama
Supreme Court took pains to indicate a friendly attitude toward
Pipeline.44 Although the commission had made no specific rate
base finding, its negative order was upheld on the ground that since
41. 252 Wis. 481,32 N. W. 2d247, 249 (1948).
42. Id. at 484, 32 N. W. 2d at 248.
43. See Esser, State Laws in Relation to the Hope Natural Gas Decision,
34 P. U. Fort. 69 (1944).
44. Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Corn., 254 Ala.
140, 146-147, 47 So. 2d 455, 459-460 (1950).
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the utility had petitioned for an increase it must, but had not,
carried the burden of establishing the "value of a proper rate
base." , Upon rehearing, however, the case was remanded in the
face of vigorous dissent, to enable the utility to submit further
evidence.: G
While Idaho judicial language is studded with Pipeline ex-
pressions47 and while it has upheld rates based fundamentally upon
original cost, it observes that "whether the decision in Smyth z.
Anzes has been modified by subsequent cases is unnecessary to
discuss.""" Unnecessary because the "company, having based its
application for a rate increase in accordance with the Commis-
sion's [original cost] formula, and the Commission, having before
it all the elements of original cost, cost of reproduction and other
itms necessary for a rate-making basis, cannot be said to have
erred when the value fixed in determining a just and reasonable
return was based on the lesser amount [emphasis added] .49
All of the New Jersey opinions mouth Pipeline doctrine. In
one case an original cost rate base was sustained against a utility's
argument in favor of reproduction (and book) cost, and against a
city's argument in favor of "reproduction cost grounded on aver-
age prices." 0 But the fact is all of these were "considered" by the
commission. And the New Jersey Supreme Court, in response to
the utility's argument that would have made it controlling, ob-
served that "depreciated reproduction cost is but a factor to be
considered in the fixation of a rate [emphasis added] . ..,,1
In a later case12 the regulating body had granted a rate increase
predicated upon book value. On appeal on behalf of consumers
Chief justice Vanderbilt, for the court, observed that the "Board
is not bound to and, indeed, should not use any single formula or
combination of formulae in arriving at a proper rate base. .... -53
There had been some evidence that the company's books of ac-
count did not accurately reflect its investment costs, though this
45. Id. at 152, 47 So. 2d at 465.
46. Id. at 152, 155, 157, 47 So. 2d at 465, 46S, 470.




50. Atlantic City Sewerage Co. v. Bd. of Public Utility Commissioners,
128 N. J. L. 359, 26 A. 2d 71, 74 (1942), Aff'd, 129 N. J. L. 401, 29 A. 2d
850 (1943).
51. Id. at 365, 26 A. 2d at 76.
52. Petition of Public Service Coordinated Transport Co., 5 N. 3. 196,
74 A. 2d 580 (1950).
53. Id. at 217,74 A. 2d at 591.
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had not been a major item in the proceeding. The case was re-
manded on the ground that it was improper to arrive at "a fair
value based solely upon a utility's books of account. '54
It is noteworthy that while New Jersey's, like Idaho's, accept-
ance even of the narrow interpretation of the Pipeline case seems
more apparent than real, deviation has not been disadvantageous to
consumers. Indeed in the last mentioned New Jersey case the
Supreme Court's refusal to accept the administrative choice of
valuation formulas meant annulment of a rate increase. A lone
dissent without opinion may mean that the majority position is
being questioned from within the court.5
The Vermont Supreme Court's position is more complicated.
It cites Smyth v. Ames and other pre-Pipeline cases in support of
the proposition that "it is shown by all the cases . . that in order
to reach a fair judgment of rates ... it is necessary that a proper
rate base and allowable expenses be determined. '" Then it goes
on to say, "The much discussed case of .. .Hope . .. did not
change this rule for . . . this case did not reject judicial right of
review as to reasonableness of rates and, obviously, if it be held
that no yardstick is necessary whereby to test this question then
judicial review as to reasonableness of rates would become utterly
meaningless."5 7 This quite obviously indicates a misunderstanding
of the new federal position. Not stopping to explain what it thought
the Hope case does mean, the court remanded so that the commis-
sion might make findings as to a "rate base and expenses."
But less than a year later the same court upheld a commission
order based on a 1943 Federal Power Commission original cost
finding. 8 The utility did not contest use of that valuation formula,
but it did object to the use of a twelve month period ending on
April 30, 1949, as a "test year" upon which to predicate revenue
and expense adjustments. In the utility's view a later test period
should have been chosen. The court quoted at length from Pipe-
line in support of the proposition that "commissions are not bound
to the service of any single formula or combination of formulas,"
that they are free to make "pragmatic adjustments" and that if
54. Ibid.
55. Central R. Co. of N. J. v. Dept. of Public Utility Commissioners,
7 N. J. 247,81 A. 2d 162 (1951).
56. Petition of New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 66 A. 2d 135, 138
(1949).
57. Ibid.
58. Petition of Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 116 Vt. 206,
71 A. 2d 576 (1950).
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the rate-order "viewed in its entirety, produces no arbitrary re-
sults" judicial inquiry is at an end.5  Moreover, "where an ad-
ministrative agency has [such] authority to choose the criteria
determinative of an issue of fact, it may reject evidence which has
no materiality in view of the criteria adopted."'60 Taken together
the two cases seem to indicate that while a "fair value" rate base
is still required in Vermont, the method of arriving at it is to be
left to administrative discretion.
Arguing before the Supreme Court of Washington, the State
regulatory body contended that only its methods, not its rates,
had been "disapproved" by the lower court. It then cited West
Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission6 (without mention of
Pipeline) in support of the proposition that, absent a finding of
confiscation, the rates must be sustained. In short the result not
the means of reaching it should control. Proceeding on the assump-
tion that "the doctrine of the Smyth case has been consistently fol-
lowed by the Supreme Court and by state courts, including the
courts of the state of Washington"' ' 2 the answer was that "While
a court might uphold rates fixed by a regulatory authority if it ap-
peared that the rates would allow the utility, all things considered,
a fair return, even though the authority in its proceedings had
committed error, no court is obliged to follow that method, and it
seems clear that such a method would be followed only in excep-
tional cases."6' 3 This seems quite clearly to repudiate the Pipeline
idea that, if a rate order "viewed in its entirety, produces no arbi-
trary result our [judicial] inquiry is at an end."
The rate order was remanded because among other reasons it
had been predicated upon what the court considered an improper
depreciation allowance. But it is noteworthy that Pipeline language
was cited in support of the regulatory agency's freedom to use
whatever valuation approach it deemed appropriate for arriving at
a "fair value" rate base.64 In fact original cost (as evidenced by
the company's books) had been used.6 5 The company did not
object to this procedure though it did introduce, and presumably
the regulatory body "considered," reproduction cost evidence.66
59. Id. at 209, 71 A. 2d at 578.
60. Id. at 210, 71 A. 2d at 579.
61. 294 U. S. 63 (1935).
62. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Public Service, 19 Wash. 2d
200, 217, 142 P. 2d 498, 508 (1943).
63. Id. at 222, 142 P. 2d at 510.
64. Id. at 235, 142 P. 2d at 520.
65. Id. at 232, 142 P. 2d at 514.
66. Ibid.
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States accepting the Hope doctrine
The Supreme Courts of Utah, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and
New Hampshire apparently accept the full Hope doctrine. Utah
Power and Light Co. v. Public Service Contmission67 is easily the
leading state case on the point. There the Commission had initiated
a hearing to reduce the Company's rates and proceeded to do so
on a prudent investment (cost) basis. On appeal the Company
contended in its original brief that it had both a constitutional and
a statutory right to have its rate base established in relation to
value as distinguished from cost, and that it was entitled to a
reasonable return on present "fair value." When the Hope deci-
sion appeared the Company abandoned its constitutional, and
vigorously pressed, its statutory argument 68-- citing earlier Utah
cases and particularly the Pennsylvania cases (see above)."" After
carefully tracing the judicial history of the rate-making problem
Chief Justice Wolfe, for the Court, rejected the Company's con-
struction of Utah's statutes. He observed that the legislature had
given full rate-making power to the Commission, subject only to
"procedural due process" and the requirement that rates be "just
and reasonable."
At the time of Smyth v. Ames a rate could not be just and
reasonable in the constitutional sense unless it permitted a fair
return on fair value. This concept has, as pointed out above,
been overruled. It would be contrary to common sense to hold
that the legislature meant "just and reasonable" only as de-
fined by the courts at the time of Smyth v. Ames and to hold
that the legislature would, in order to authorize the Commis-
sion to use prudent investment, be required to reenact the
statute saying that it meant 'just and reasonable' as that term
is construed today. To the contrary, it must be assumed that
the legislature contemplated that the concept of that which is
'just and reasonable' might change with social trends., Possibly
that is why the legislature did not prescribe any definite formula
to be applied to every case without variation. The term 'just
and reasonable' is not an absolute.... The Commission did not
err in refusing to fix rates upon a fair value base.70
Citing and quoting from this opinion, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that, "We do not consider that the statutory
requirement that rates shall be 'just and reasonable' was an enact-
67. 107 Utah 155, 152 P. 2d 542 (1944).
68. Id. at 163, 152 P. 2d at 545-546.
69. Id. at 184, 152 P. 2d at 555.
70. Id. at 190-191, 152 P. 2d at 558.
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ment into law of the fair value doctrine of Smyth v. Ames. .. .
But, it continued, the relief furnished by Hope does not "relieve
the commission of the duty to make findings of fact essential to
permit review of its conclusions. ' 72 On the latter point-similar
to that stressed by the Wisconsin and Idaho courts and by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in his Hope dissent 7 3-- the case was remanded
to the Commission.
In what appears to be essentially dicta the Supreme Court of
New Mexico, citing Pipeline and Hope, has observed that the doc-
trine of Smyth v. Ames "while followed for many years, has been
criticized so severely by later decisions that it has but little, if any,
value in determining a formula for rate making."7 4 Several pages
of discussion that follow show quite obviously that the Court went
out of its way to indicate full acceptance of the Hope doctrine.
In a reasonably clear-cut decision upholding a depreciated book
value rate base against an attack predicated upon the state and
national constitutions Oklahoma in 1951 joined the Hope proces-
sion.7
Conclusion
The paucity of appeals to the courts may mean that some utility
commissions are not attempting to depart from the old doctrines.
Apart from two state supreme courts that carefully avoided the
issue (Virginia and Indiana), only fifteen have had occasion to
reconsider Sinyth v. Ames in the light of Pipeline and (or) Hope.
Six of these (Minnesota, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
North Dakota, and South Dakota) failed to make any concessions
to the new federal court position. Three more (Alabama, Idaho,
and New Jersey) accommodated their language, if not their deci-
sions, to Pipeline, while two more (Vermont and Washington)
after some initial difficulty seem to have accepted at least the nar-
row interpretation of that case.75 Only four (Utah, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and New Hampshire) appear to have broken with
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358, 64 A. 2d 9, 14 (1949).
72. Id. at 359, 64 A. 2d at 15. See also Petition of Central Vermont
Utility Public Service Corp., 71 A. 2d 576 (1950).
73. 320 U. S. 591,624, 627-628 (1944).
74. State v. Mountain States Tel and Tel. Co. Co., 54 N. 2. 315, 224
P. 2d 155, 168 (1950).
75. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 204 Okla. 225, 230 P. 2d 260
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76. Compare the position of the Georgia and Wisconsin Supremb
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the old tradition in favor of the views expressed by the federal
Supreme Court in the Hope case.
In view of the "persistence of substantive due process in the
states"7 7 with respect to other forms of business regulation, it is
noteworthy that only in Massachusetts, Vermont, Washington,
and Minnesota is the restrictive position based clearly on constitu-
tional grounds. In all other instances the narrow view is found to
be imbedded in legislation-where it is subject to removal by
legislative action.
77. See Paulsen, The Persistence of Sitbstantive Due Process in the
States, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 91 (1950).
